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Analytic Ecclesiology: The Social Ontology of the
Church Joshua CockayneUniversity of St Andrews
Abstract: In this paper, I aim to show that analytic philosophy cancontribute to the theological discussion of ecclesiology. By consideringrecent analytic work on social ontology, I outline how we might thinkof the Church as one entity, constituted by many disparate parts. Thepaper begins with an overview of the theological constraints for thepaper, and then proceeds to examine recent work on the philosophy ofsocial ontology and group agency. Drawing on this literature, I outlinethree models of social ontology from the history of philosophy andsuggest reasons why all of them fail to provide an account of theChurch’s agency. Finally, I develop an alternative model which, Isuggest, better fits the conditions stipulated.
IntroductionWhile analytic theology is still a young and emerging discipline, the lack of work onecclesiology within this field is striking. Despite pathbreaking work on many of thecore doctrines of the Christian faith, work on ecclesiology has sadly not received thesame share of attention.1 But if, as Oliver Crisp has claimed, analytic theology is
1 As William J. Abraham notes, “Theologians are relatively secure on what counts [sic] as relevanttopics in ecclesiology; they pursue questions relative to the identity, nature, structures, ministry,sacraments, and mission of the church. It is much less clear what role philosophers should have in thisdomain” (2010, 170). Of these relevant topics, the only notable area of increased interest in the eightyears (since Abraham published his discussion) is that of ministry and sacraments. Excellent recentwork by Terence Cuneo (2016), Nicholas Wolterstorff (2015, 2018) and James Arcadi (2018) has donemuch to advance the analytic study of ecclesiology by focusing on the sacraments and ministry of theChurch. Yet, there is much more to be done. Ecclesiology is a broad field, with many important issues,many of which are of philosophical interest. For instance, whilst there has been an increase of work onthe Eucharist, other sacraments have not received the same level of attention. There is surely muchthat analytic philosophy can contribute to the discussion of the sacraments of baptism, ordination, andmarriage. Moreover, while there have been advances in the study of liturgy, much of this discussionmakes assumptions about the Church’s ontology which could be fleshed out analytically. For instance,in his discussion of the Church’s worship, Wolterstorff writes, “The church blesses God, praises God,thanks God, confesses her sins to God, petitions God, listens to God’s Word, celebrates the Eucharist.It’s not the individual members who do these things simultaneously; it’s the assembled body that doesthese things” (2015, 11).
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committed to explicating the core claims of the Christian tradition,2 and since beliefin the “one holy, catholic, and apostolic Church” is a core doctrine of this tradition,3then analytic theologians need to pay more attention to this important area oftheology.This paper seeks to fill this lacuna by addressing an important issue withinecclesiology from the perspective of analytic philosophy. 4 The primary issue thispaper is devoted to is that of the Church’s ontology; I seek to give an account of howthe Church can be constituted by many individual Christians, and remain united asone, despite its enormous diversity and internal fragmentation. The paper proceedsas follows. First, I outline a minimalist theology of the nature of the Church and itsrelation to its members, by stipulating the theological constraints of my discussion.Then, drawing from recent work on the philosophy of social ontology and groupagency, I consider how thinking philosophically about the Church can help to clarifythe minimalist account I describe in the first section. I outline three models of socialontology from the history of philosophy and suggest reasons why all of them fail toprovide an account of the Church’s agency. Finally, I develop an alternative modelwhich, I suggest, better fits the conditions stipulated.
Stating the questionFirst, it is important to note that the use of the term “church” is not alwaysconsistent—as William J. Abraham notes, “‘church’ . . . can refer to a building, a localChristian community, a modern Christian denomination, and the whole body ofChristians worldwide. Even then, this common usage is deeply contested by variousgroups of Christians” (2010, 171). In this paper, it is the latter use of the term, namely,to refer to the “whole body of Christians worldwide,” which I am interested in. Morespecifically, it is the theological claim that the Christian Church is one united entitywhich I am concerned with.The primary question of this paper, then, is this: What kind of thing or entityis the united body of the Church? There are many different answers we might give tothis question—As Evelyn Underhill describes it, the Church is a single “organismwhich is quickened and united by that Spirit of supernatural charity which sanctifiesthe human race from above” (1936, 83). Such unity is not the work of human effort,
2 Crisp defines analytic theology as a form of systematic theology committed to “explicating theconceptual content of the Christian tradition . . . using particular religious texts that are part of theChristian tradition, including sacred scripture, as well as human reason, reflection, and praxis(particularly religious practices), as sources for theological judgments” (2017, 160) by using the toolsof analytic philosophy. Moreover, Crisp suggests, analytic theology as systematic theology should be“done from the perspective of a particular confession for the sake of the church” (2017, 162).3 Claims about the Church feature in both the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed and the Apostles’Creed.4 While there is some existing philosophical work which exposits the ecclesiologies of particularthinkers, my approach here will be much more general. See, for instance, Phillip Quinn’s (2000)“Kantian Philosophical Ecclesiology,” Maria Rosa Antognazza’s (2016) work on Leibnizianecclesiology, and Bruce Kirmsse’s (2000) Kierkegaardian ecclesiology.
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Underhill notes, but, rather, must be understood in relation “to the purposes andaction of God” (1936, 83). In Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s work on ecclesiology, he describesthe Church as a “collective person” (1930/1998, 260), constituted by the manyindividual Christians, capable of both glorifying God and sinning against God.There are a number of related questions which arise in considering theseanswers: How can the Church be constituted of such a disparate and dividedcollection of individuals and remain united? What is the relation between each ofthese individuals and the wider whole? And how can the Church be capable of actingas a collective person or organism? In many respects, these questions are not uniqueto the Church; there are many groups who we describe as united in diversity, andcapable of acting together, despite being fragmented. We talk of governments,nations, and corporations as united agents, capable of acting, holding beliefs andbeing held responsible. We also sometimes talk of social wholes as acting togetherdespite disagreement and diversity—indeed, the very task of ruling as ademocratically elected government is surely to remain united in spite of division anddisagreement. As I will explore in this paper, there is a rich history of philosophicalliterature devoted to explaining the nature of social wholes. If philosophers canexplain the relationship between individuals and the nations which they constitute,then perhaps such explanations can play the same role in our ecclesiology.Yet, while applications of the philosophical literature on social ontology toquestions concerning the Church’s ontology can be helpful, such applications alsohave their limits. As all of the answers above indicate, the Church is a social whole,but one that is unique; in Bonhoeffer’s words, the “church is a form of community suigeneris” (1930/1998, 266). Thus, as Paul Avis notes, ecclesiology needs to remainsensitive to both the divine and human aspects of the Church as a unity. He writesthat, although the Churchcomes from God and depends on God, it is fully embedded in creaturelyreality, in all the changes and chances, the risks and dilemmas of thisworld. It is bound up in the historical, the political, and the socialcomplexion of human life in the world . . . the church is alsocontaminated by human sin and crime. But in spite of all that, the divineorigin and divine upholding of the church do shine through (2018, 9).This paper seeks to draw insights from the philosophical literature on social ontology,while remaining sensitive to the theological constraints of Christian Scripture andtradition. 5 We begin, then, by considering the theological parameters of analyticecclesiology.6
5 Note that one related philosophical question is that of composition and identity—if the Church isconstituted by its members, is it identical to its members? Or is it somehow more than the sum of itsparts? One’s answer to this question will depend on one’s stance on mereology, and whether one takesconstitution and identity to be the same relation. See Baxter and Cotnoir (eds., 2014) for a recentcollection in defence of the composition as identity view. This is not a point I will explore here.6 It is important to clarify at this point that to give a philosophical explanation is not to diminish themystery of the doctrine of the Church. There is a helpful analogue in theological methodology whichcan be of use here. Avery Dulles describes his theological task as working with “models,” “aspects,” or
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Setting the constraintsThere are, no doubt, hundreds of possible philosophical accounts of the nature of theChurch which might be given, however, here I seek to give an account which is withinthe general constrains of theological orthodoxy. Thus, I outline some minimaltheological claims which will act as constraints for the proceeding discussion.7 Iprovide some brief commentary on each of these points below:1. The Church is constituted by individual Christian disciples.82. These individual Christian disciples at times coalesce into gatheredcollectives.3. The gathered collectives and individuals which partly constitute theChurch are not united in practice, theology or belief.4. Such disunity arises, at least partly, because of the sin of those whoconstitute the Church.5. The Holy Spirit unites the actions of the constituent parts of the Church torespond to God in worship, through Christ.6. Christ has authority and headship over the Church.Let us take each claim in turn.
1. The Church is constituted by individual Christian disciples.In Scripture, there are at least 96 metaphors used to explain the nature of the Church(Minear 1960, 25). The most well-known of these metaphors, perhaps, is the ApostlePaul’s description of the Church as Christ’s body, in which members each playdifferent roles, united together to act as one (1 Corinthians 12:12-31).9 Elsewhere, weare told that the individual members are like bricks, which together constitute a“dimensions” and never describing the Church “directly,” since the Church is ultimately mysterious(1978, 14). Dulles suggests that indirect descriptions of the Church can allow us to grow inunderstanding of the Church, as long as these descriptions remain indirect. I suggest that by providinga philosophical explanation of one possible way in which the Church may be united yet divided, thesame might be said. The explanations which I explore in the remainder of this paper are models,intended to expand our understanding of the Church, but without giving an ultimate account of theChurch. Ultimately, as I will conclude, whilst such thinking can be helpful, it must remain modest in itsaims. In what follows, I consider how the philosophy of social ontology might provide onephilosophical explanation to understand the Church’s one-ness in spite of its division.7 While, in an ideal world, it might be preferable to provide a detailed theological justification for aparticular ecclesiology, and then to consider the application of philosophy to it, such a task would veryquickly spiral out of control. Thus, instead of giving a thorough defence of a particular theologicalstance, I offer a number of assumptions which act as constraints for the proceeding discussion. Theintention is that these assumptions are relatively uncontroversial, theologically speaking, and broadlyconsistent with the New Testament discussions of ecclesiology.8 Thanks to an anonymous referee for help in summarizing these points as clearly and broadly aspossible.9 This is not the only place in which we find such an analogy. For example, the metaphor of the bodyand its parts is used in a number of places, for example, Colossians 1:18-20, Colossians 3:12-17,Romans 12:3-8.
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temple (2 Corinthians 6:14-18, 1 Corinthians 6:18-20, 1 Corinthians 3:10-17), or ahousehold constituted by many stones (1 Timothy 3:14-15, Ephesians 2:11-20, 1Peter 2:3-8). The metaphors of the New Testament share a common feature: theChurch is described throughout Scripture as being a unity, in which many differentindividuals are brought together as one.10 Note that while the above claim states thatthe Church is constituted by individual Christian disciples, it does not state that it is
wholly constituted by these individuals. The Church might also include the hosts ofheaven—the angels and archangels, as well as the Saints gathered in glory. This willdepend, in part, on one’s own theological stance, and I remain neutral on thesepossibilities.
2. These individual Christian disciples at times coalesce into gathered
collectives.An important feature of the relationship between the Church and gathered churchcollectives is that gathered churches seek to be related to the Church in some way.These gathered communities of individual churches, act as the “here-and-nowembodiment” (Underhill, 1936, 86) of the Church as a united whole. We might alsomake a normative claim concerning the relationship between gathered churchcollectives and the Church—in Hans Küng’s words, “The Church is one, and therefore
should be one” (1967, 273-274; emphasis in the original). The important point for ourpurposes is that a gathered church collective ought to (or at least ought to strive to)resemble the unity of the Church as a whole entity.11
3. The gathered collectives and individuals which partly constitute the Church
are not united in practice, theology or belief.As the Christian Church rapidly expanded, the claims made by Scripture about theunity of the Church were reiterated—the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed (381 AD)states, “We believe . . . in one holy catholic and apostolic Church.” Yet, the Church, asit exists today, is splintered and theologically divided in a way which must have beenunimaginable to the original readers of the New Testament. Support for this claim canbe seen by attending to the empirical facts about all of the groups which identify asbelonging to the Church today. If this Church is a united entity, it is united in spite ofenormous schism and diversity. As Avis describes it,Ecclesiology wrestles with the truth that the church is at one and at the
same time both united and divided. It knows itself to be united in Christ;
10 Moreover, as N.T. Wright notes, “from our earliest evidence, the Christians regarded themselves asa new family, directly descended from the family of Israel, but now transformed” (1997, 447). TheSecond Vatican Council stresses a similar point, noting that “The Church of Christ acknowledges thatin God’s plan of salvation the beginning of faith and election is to be found in the patriarchs, Moses, andthe prophets” (Flannery (ed.), 1975, 391). While the relationship between Israel and the Church hasmany layers of theological complexity, the point for our purposes here seems clear: The Church is aunited body, composed of many distinct parts.11 The agency of the gathered church is something I consider in more detail in Cockayne (2018).
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its unity is part of its confession; but it also knows itself to belamentably divided. . . . [T]he fact of the fragmentation of the onechurch is the almost unbearable paradox that confronts ecclesiology(2018, 24).It is clearly possible that not all of these self-identified members of the Churchactually belong to the Church, and there are some ecclesial traditions which willsimply deny that there is any substantial schism in the true Church.12 The unbearableparadox of ecclesiology which Avis describes here will not arise if one thinks that theChurch is undivided. In this case, one’s ontology of the Church will be relativelystraightforward. Yet, any ecclesiology which recognises these diverse groups asbelonging to the Church in some way, must wrestle with the issue of how to reconcilesuch division with an account of unity.
4. Such disunity arises, at least partly, because of the sin of those who constitute
the Church.Diversity appears to be at the heart of many of the Biblical passages concerning theunity of the one Church. For instance, writing on the body metaphor in 1 Corinthians12, Gordon Fee writes that, “Paul’s primary concern with this imagery is not that thebody is one even though it has many members, thus arguing for their need for unitydespite their diversity. Rather, his concern is expressed in v. 14, that even though the
body is one, it does not consist in one member but of many, thus arguing for their needfor diversity, since they are in fact one body” (Fee, 601; emphasis in the original).13While diversity is clearly affirmed in the New Testament as important for theChurch, the diversity Paul has in mind in 1 Corinthians appears to be a diversity ofgifts and diversity of belonging. The diversity we see in the contemporary Churchappears to be a source of disunity. As Fee puts this point, “what is disconcerting”about the contemporary Church,
12 Vatican II suggests that whilst the Catholic Church is the true Church, there are “elements ofsanctification and of truth . . . found outside of its visible structure” (1964, Chapter 1.8). It alsodescribes those outside of the Catholic Church as “separated” (1964, Chapter 8.4), suggesting that, tosome extent, these factions still belong to the Church of Christ, even if they lie outside of its visiblestructures. Although this claim is perhaps weaker than the one outlined in 3, it still requires us to saysomething about how unity in diversity is possible. Thus, as McGrath describes it, the Second VaticanCouncil moves away from an “imperialist approach, which declares that there is only oneempirical . . . church which deserves to be known as the true church . . . [in] recognizing other Christianchurches as ‘separated’ Christian brothers and sisters” (2011, 392).13 As C.K. Barrett notes,The genitive (Χριστοῦ) [Christos] is not of identity but of possession and authority;not, the body which is Christ, of which Christ consists, but, the body that belongs toChrist, and over which he rules . . . separate from the body even though continuouswith it. Since the resurrection . . . Christ has been the new humanity living in the newage. His members have their place in this eschatological entity, and, as members of it,must live accordingly (1971, 292).
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is that what for Paul is the basis of unity, namely, their common life inthe Spirit, has in later times become the point of so muchtension. . . . [I]f the work of the Spirit appears to be the cause ofdisunity among some, it is certainly not the Spirit’s fault. Our commonfallenness unfortunately often causes both pride and suspicion ordistrust to prevail when it comes to the work of the Spirit (1987, 607).14In part, then, the disunity in the Church is a result of human disobedience or defiance.A stronger claim is often made, namely, that the Church is not only divided becauseof the sin of individual members, but also, that the Church itself is sinful in somerespect. As the Catholic Catechism puts it, the Church is “at once holy and always inneed of purification” (Flannery (ed.), 1975, 358).15 Or as Dietrich Bonhoeffer puts thispoint, “Among human beings there is no such thing as a pure, organic community life.The peccatorum communio [community of sin] continues to coexist within the
sanctorum communio.” (1930/1998, 213). Any account which seeks to explain thenature of the Church, then, must say something about its sinful nature.16
5. The Holy Spirit unites the actions of the constituent parts of the Church to
respond to God in worship, through Christ.Because of the common work of the Spirit at work in each member of the Church, Paulregards the Church as having a unity brought about by the Spirit. As Fee describes, inthe discussion of unity in 1 Corinthians 12, Paul’s primary concern “is not to delineatehow an individual believer becomes a believer, but to explain how they, though many,are one body. The answer: The Spirit, whom all alike have received” (1987, 603). Thisemphasis is also reflected in the creedal claims about the Church: in the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed the claims concerning the “holy, catholic, apostolic Church”follow from the claim, “we believe in the Holy Spirit.”17 As Karl Barth puts this point,to state “I believe in the church,” meansthat I believe that here, at this place, in this assembly, the work of theHoly Spirit takes place. By that is not intended a deification of thecreature; the church is not the object of faith, we do not believe in thechurch; but we do believe that in this congregation the work of the HolySpirit becomes an event (1959, 143).
14 In Bonhoeffer’s words, “The community of saints as the community of penitent sinners is heldtogether by the unity of the body of Christ” (1930/1998, 212).15 See Anderson (2002) for a more detailed discussion of the Catholic theology of the Church’s sin. Seealso Jeremy Bergen’s (2011) discussion of ecclesial repentance.16 Because of this emphasis on disunity as a result of human sin, Fee notes that we must be careful notto force our own human “brand of ‘spiritual unity’ on the church as simply another human machination.Our desperate need is for a sovereign work of the Spirit to do among us what all our ‘programmedunity’ cannot” (1987, 607).17 TF Torrance writes that, “the clauses on the Church do not constitute an independent set of beliefs,but follow from belief in the Holy Spirit, for holy Church is the fruit of the Holy Spirit. . . . If we believein the Holy Spirit, we also believe in the existence of one Church in the one Spirit” (1988, 252).
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6. Christ has authority and headship over the Church.While the Spirit is integral in the work of uniting the Church, the New Testament iskeen to stress that Christ is the “head” (in the body metaphor) (Colossians 1:18) orthe “cornerstone” (in the building metaphor) (Ephesians 2:19) of the Church. That is,the unity of the body is the will of Christ, actualised by the work of the Spirit. As ErnestBest maintains, the centrality of Christ for one’s ecclesiology is key to understandingclaims about the Church’s unity. Best writes that the unity of the Church “isnot . . . imposed from outside; Christ is himself the unity. . . . The Church, as Body ofChrist, is a unity, but a unity with Christ. It is not identical with him; but it is notseparate from him” (1955, 96). While there is some theological controversy in howbest to understand the relationship between the work of Christ and the Holy Spirit inbringing about this unity,18 the above claim seeks to outline something fairly minimalin relation to the Church; namely, that the unity of the Church is the work of the Spirit(however this work is understood) which actualises the will of Christ.With these parameters in place, let us now consider the philosophicalliterature on the nature of social groups.
Groups as agents: Mapping out the positionsTo begin, it will be helpful to map out the different positions one might holdconcerning the ontology of groups. First, it is important to observe that regardless ofone’s group ontology, talk of groups is common place in everyday language. Forinstance, we talk of a government’s believing in certain values, of the unethicality of acompany’s actions in the financial crisis, of the sublimity of a jazz quartet’sperformance, and of a class’s good behaviour in a school lesson. In other words, wespeak as if groups are capable of holding beliefs, performing actions, and being heldresponsible. But just because group-talk is part of our language, it does notnecessarily follow that it must be part of our ontology.Indeed, some group-talk clearly appears to be either metaphorical, ormisconceived. For instance, Anthony Quinton writes,We do, of course, speak freely of the mental properties and acts of agroup in the way we do of individual people. Groups are said to havebeliefs, emotions and attitudes, and to take decisions and makepromises. But these ways of speaking are plainly metaphorical. Toascribe mental predicates to a group is always an indirect way ofascribing such predicates to its members. . . . To say that the industrial
18 Alastair McGrath discusses the relationship between the Spirit and Christ in the context of theChurch, and notes that this issue is theologically contentious (2011, 387). In Ignatius’s theology, forinstance, the Spirit actualizes the presence of Christ in the community of the Church, whereas inthinkers such as Leonardo Boff, the work of the Spirit is to make us conscious of the saving work ofChrist in forming the Church (1986, 11). In the Eastern Orthodox tradition, John Zizioulas (1985)describes the Spirit as constituting the Church which was instituted by Christ.
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working class is determined to resist anti-trade union laws is to say thatall or most industrial workers are so minded (1975, 17).While some might think it metaphorical or misconceived to think of the working classas existing above and beyond its individual members, endorsing eliminativism aboutgroups, in the way Quinton describes here, misses something important about thesocial world. Group eliminativism does not allow us to criticize or make ethicalconstraints on groups unless we can reduce the behaviour to individual behaviour.Yet, group behaviour is not easily separable in this way. As Peter French argues,“The Democratic party nominated George McGovern” is not reducibleto a series of statements about the votes cast by each member of theparty. Each delegate at the national convention casting a vote forMcGovern was, we assume, behaving in a standard and acceptablefashion; that is, each voted for the candidate he favoured and that isprecisely what delegates are expected to do. The fact that McGovernwas nominated . . . was the result of the way the Democratic Party wasthen organized (1984, 14-15).French’s point is simply this: to reduce group-talk to individual-talk is to misssomething vital about the way in which these individuals are structured in relation tothe group, without which, we cannot understand the actions described by group-talk.If group eliminativism is true, then we cannot hold corporations responsible for theiractions, or place ethical demands on political parties, but we can only dictate whatindividual members of these groups can or should do.While there is not space here for a detailed rejection of eliminativism aboutgroups, in what follows, I assume that there is at least some group-talk that cannot bereduced to talk about individuals. Moreover, we need not go too far into thinkingabout the possibility of group eliminativism in relation to the Church, since to do sowould be to do disservice to Scripture’s emphasis on the reality of the Church, as wellas the rich theological tradition affirming that we should take the existence of such aChurch seriously. Putting aside the possibility of providing an eliminativist account ofthe Church, then, let us consider how we might think of the Church in group-realistterms. Discussions of group realism have historically fallen into one of two camps,which, borrowing from Christian List and Philip Pettit, can be divided into“redundant” and “non-redundant” group realism (2011, 7). As I will explain shortly,there are further divisions to be made within these two camps but let us begin byconsidering these two historical positions. The diagram below (List and Pettit, 2011,7) indicates how these positions divide:
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First, a kind of redundant realism has been defended, particularly in thecontext of political philosophy. Such accounts typically defend an authorizationmodel of group agency in which what it is for the group to act can be explainedentirely in reference to some individual who is authorized to act on behalf of thegroup. For instance, in the work of Thomas Hobbes (1651/2003), John Locke(1690/2004) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762/2007), we find examples of modelswhich fit this category. In Hobbes’s Leviathan, he describes a kind of group-realism ofa state in which the citizens authorize an individual (such as a monarch), or a smallgroup (such as an aristocracy) to speak on behalf of the state. Hobbes writes that,A Multitude of men, are made One Person, when they are by one man,or one Person, Represented; so that it be done with the consent of everyone of that Multitude in particular. For it is the Unity of the Representer,not the Unity of the Represented, that maketh the Person One. And it isthe Representer that beareth the Person, and but one Person: And
Unity, cannot otherwise be understood in Multitude (1651/2003, 114).On this account, group agency arises due to a group of individuals collectivelyauthorizing some individual (or group of individuals) to act on their behalf. Suchaccounts can be described as redundant realist accounts since everything we can sayof the group as an agent can be explained in relation to the individual who has beenauthorized to act on behalf of a group. In other words, while this model is realist aboutthe ontology of groups, the explanation of how groups think, act, and deliberate isentirely explicable by giving an account of how the authorized individual thinks, acts,and deliberates. In the next section, I will consider the application of such a model tothinking about the Church as a unity. First, however, it will be helpful to consider howwe might provide a non-redundant group realism.Historically, most accounts of non-redundant group realism have beenversions of a kind of animation theory. Such theories claim that group level agencyemerges from a collection of individuals through some mysterious force or spirit. Oneof the most prominent of these accounts is Otto von Gierke’s (1934) Natural Law and
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the Theory of Society.19 Just as our human bodies are composed by individual parts,which organically unite to form a whole entity which is more than the sum of its parts,we can think of corporate bodies as organically united bodies constituted byindividuals. On such accounts, language of organic wholes or bodies is used as a kindof black box, in which a mysterious entity emerges from a collective of individuals.While similarly to authorization accounts, animation accounts are realist aboutgroups, unlike authorization accounts, animation theorists think that co-ordinationbetween individuals is insufficient for providing a group ontology. What is needed inaddition is some mysterious force which unites groups together.Furthermore, animation accounts of group agency are generally anti-individualist, thinking that individuals must be understood in relation to groups(rather than the other way around). For instance, F.H. Bradley writes that, “To knowwhat a man is . . . you must not take him in isolation. . . . The mere individual is adelusion of theory” (1876, 173-174). Individualism, in this context, is the thesis that“economic and social explanations should resist any appeal to psychologicallymysterious social forces” (List and Pettit, 2011, 3). Just as the physicalist claims thatwe should not appeal to any mysterious force or substance to explain the workings ofthe mind (even if she rejects eliminativism about minds), the individualist aboutgroups holds that we should not appeal to any mysterious force or substance toexplain the workings of groups (even if she is not an eliminativist about groups).While historically, group-realism has tended towards either metaphysicallymysterious accounts of groups, that depend on rejecting individualism, or accountsthat are reducible to individual actions and beliefs, there have been some recentattempts to offer a third way of thinking about groups. The table below (amendedfrom List and Pettit (2011, 10)) is a helpful way of seeing what such an account mightinvolve:
Realist theories Redundant or non-
redundant group-
agency talk?
Methodologically
individualistic or not?Authorization theories
(e.g. Hobbes, Rousseau,
Locke)
Redundant Individualistic
Animation theories (e.g.
von Gierke, Figgis,
Maitland)
Non-redundant Non-individualistic
Functionalist theories(e.g. List & Pettit,
French)
Non-redundant Individualistic
Recent work in analytic philosophy has attempted to give an account of group agencywhich combines features of these two historical accounts. Functionalist accounts seekto affirm the intuitive aspects of both accounts, while overcoming the difficulties
19 Other accounts include J.N. Figgis (1914) and F.W. Maitland (1911). See Runciman, 1997 for asummary of this literature.
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associated with both. Like the authorization approach, such accounts seek to give anindividualistic, non-mysterious account of group agency. Yet, unlike the authorizationapproach, and like the animation theorists, they attempt to show how group-talk isnon-redundant. Such accounts generally begin by stipulating conditions for a thing’scounting as an agent, and then ask whether groups can meet these conditions. It isimportant to note that endorsing a functionalist account of group agency does notcommit one to saying that groups have conscious states; as Deborah Tollefsendescribes, “agency is best thought of on a spectrum, with very simple agents at oneend and very complex agents at the other. Perhaps the very complex ones areconscious, and the simple ones are not. Agency isn’t an on and off switch” (2015, 53).However, it does commit one to saying that groups are the kind of things which canhold propositional attitudes such as beliefs. Thus, Tollefsen concedes, “[i]f you are aperson who thinks that propositional attitudes are states only of phenomenallyconscious beings, then group mental states are going to be a particularly difficultthing for you to swallow” (2015, 53).Let us consider functionalist accounts in more detail. French (1995) stipulatesthat agents must display the capacities for intentionality (i.e. they must do somethingfor a reason or purpose), rationality (i.e. they must be responsive to arguments thatconcern these reasons), and they must be able to respond to criticism (i.e. they mustbe capable of adjusting their actions accordingly) (1995, 10-12). French argues thatmany corporate groups meet these criteria, and so should be considered agents. Listand Pettit endorse a similar account of agency and develop this in more detail. Theysuggest that,an “agent”, on our account, is a system with these features: it hasrepresentational states, motivational states, and a capacity to act ontheir basis. When processed appropriately, the representational statesco-vary with certain variations in the environment: for example, withthe changing positions of cylinders. And the motivational states leavethe agent at rest or trigger action, depending on whether themotivating specifications are realized or unrealized in the representedenvironment (2011, 20).On this account, to be considered an agent something must have (1) representationalstates, (2) motivational states, and (3) a capacity to act on these states. Note that tobe an agent on this account, is not sufficient for personhood. List and Pettit’s firstexample of something which fulfils these criteria is a robot which “acts to maintainthe pattern of upright cylinders in a recalcitrant and changing world, where cylinderstopple under various influences” (2011, 20). As they expand these conditions, “A stateis ‘representational’ if it plays the role of depicting the world, and ‘motivational’ if itplays the role of motivating action” (2011, 21). However, they note, their positiondoes not specify the “precise physical nature of intentional states,” but only “theappropriate functional role” (2011, 21). This functional role could be fulfilled by ahuman being, a goldfish, a robot, or even a group of individuals.Given this account of agency, we can now consider how a group can beconsidered an agent in its own right. The majority of examples of group-agency
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require some level of cooperation or collective intentionality between individualgroup members. In many cases, a group of individuals “intend that they together actso as to form and enact a single system of belief and desire, at least within a clearlydefined scope; they each intend to do their own part in a salient plan for ensuringgroup-agency within that scope, believing that others will do their part too” (2011,34). The relationship between the individual and the group will partly depend onone’s role in the group. For instance, one might take an active role in the group, inwhich one acts with “full awareness for the pursuit of the group’s ends” (2011, 35).That is, they act wholly or partly on behalf of a group when they act. For instance, anegotiator in a trade union acts on behalf of all the members in the group for theinterests of the group as a whole when negotiating a better financial deal with agovernment or organization. An individual can also take an authorizing role in thegroup. In such a case, she may not actively contribute to the actions of the group, butin virtue of her membership, she endorses and authorizes those who do act on behalfof the group. For instance, in being a member of a trade union, one authorizes anegotiator or management group to speak on behalf of the group.It is important to note that on this account, the way in which the group meetsthe conditions for agency depends on the structure and decision-making processes ofthe group. As List and Pettit note, “to count as an agent, a group must exhibit at leasta modicum of rationality. And so its members must find a form of organization thatensures, as far as possible, that the group satisfies attitude-to-fact, attitude-to-action,and attitude-to-attitude standards of rationality” (2010, 36). In the case of acorporation, for instance, these conditions for rationality will be met by those whoare responsible for the group’s actions, by means of an appropriate system of votingor group deliberation.20In the next section, I consider to what extent these accounts of group agencycan help us to understand the agency of the Church.
The Church as a group agent: The application of social
ontology to ecclesiologyLet us return to our map of realist positions on group ontology and consider theirpotential for thinking about the Church as a group agent.First, we might think, there are good reasons to endorse an authorizationtheory of the Church. Indeed, since we wish to say that the work of the Church isprimarily the work of the Holy Spirit in conformity with the will of Christ, theauthorization model looks promising.21 However, we can quickly dismiss such a
20 I will not unpack the detailed account of group deliberation endorsed by List and Pettit, for as wewill see, such deliberation clearly does not occur in the Church.21 Some strands of reformed theology appear to propose an account of ecclesiology which has notablesimilarities to authorization ontology. For example, as J.B. Torrance (1996) describes, in the Church,Christ provides both the “substance” of worship as well as acting as the “real agent in all true worship”(1996, 4-5). On Torrance’s account of worship, Christ’s actions provide not only the God-to-humanward actions of saving human beings, but also, the human-to-Godward actions of responding to
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possibility if we wish to claim that the itself Church is to be regarded as sinful (in theway Bonhoeffer describes, for instance). Moreover, if we wish to think of the Churchas divided (as stipulated in 3) because of the sin of its members (as stipulated in 4),then it appears difficult to endorse the authorization account. It is important to notethat there must be more than divine agency at work in the agency of the Church, evenif the Spirit is the primary agent at work in the Church. On an authorization model,the actions of the Church are explicable only in reference to Christ or the Holy Spirit.If we assume God is incapable of sinning, then it is difficult to see how anauthorization model could explain the sin of the Church.Let us consider whether animation accounts have more potential to explainthe Church’s ontology. There are many intuitive reasons to endorse such a view, andmany philosophers and theologians have given such an account. For instance, NevilleFiggis, writing in Churches in the Modern State builds on an animation theory toexplain the ontology of the Church. Figgis asks:Does the Church exist by some inward living force, with powers of self-development like a person; or is she a mere aggregate, a fortuitousconcourse of ecclesiological atoms, treated it may be as one forpurposes of convenience, but with no real claim to a mind or will of herown? (1913, 40)Answering his own question, he continues,It is, in a word, a real life and personality which those bodies are forcedto claim, which we believe that they possess by the nature of the case,and not by the arbitrary grant of the sovereign. To deny this real life is
God in worship. Torrance writes that, Christ is “our great High Priest and ascended Lord, the one trueworshipper who unites us to himself by the Spirit in an act of memory and in a life of communion, ashe lifts us up by word and sacrament into the very triune life of God” (1996, 5). In other words,Torrance describes Christ as acting as mediator on behalf of all humanity in his worship of the Father.This model of the Church’s worship looks remarkably similar to the Hobbesian picture of authorizationaction in government. Just as the people authorize a person or group to speak and act on their behalf,we might think that through our union with Christ and participation in Christ, we authorize Christ toact on our behalf in responding to the work of the Father. On Torrance’s picture, worship is notsomething we engage in, but something we participate in through the ongoing work of Christ. And thus,we might suppose that a model of Church agency needs only to provide an account of the agency ofChrist and an account of our union in Christ in order to give an ontology of the Church. Yet, even inTorrance’s account, we contribute something to the worship of the Church, however minimal this maybe. What Torrance wishes to resist is the kind of individualism which emphasises the importance ofthe individual’s response in worship. And so, it is not clear that an authorization model entirelycaptures Torrance’s description of worship.However, as a referee helpfully points out, one strongly in the Reformed camp might arguethat fallen humans clearly cannot offer laudable worship to God and so any contribution to worshipcan only be the work of the Holy Spirit, thereby claiming that the authorization model is correct. Onthis way of reading Torrance’s account, it is not that we authorize Christ to act on our behalf, but thatChrist authorizes us to engage in true worship (with thanks to Philip-Neri Reese for this suggestion).Unfortunately, there is not space to fully explore these connections here.
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to be false to the facts of social existence and is of the same nature asthat denial of human personality which we call slavery (1913, 42).The animation account takes seriously the organic metaphor presented in Scriptureto explain the ontology of the Church and the relation between the Church and itsmembers—organic metaphors are common place in explaining not only the ontologyof the Church, but also of society more generally. Indeed, such a position provides anintuitive way of explaining the initial constraints outlined in the first section.However, there are reasons to be dissatisfied with such an account.22 Theanimation account is not individualistic enough to provide a useful application toChristian theology. Richard Bauckham (2015), writing on the Gospel of John, notesthat while biblical scholars are right to resist a certain kind of individualism ininterpreting the New Testament, they should resist endorsing a position whichaffirms that the collective is somehow more real than the individual. He notes thatwhile “Human beings in all cultures throughout history have been aware ofthemselves as distinct subjects of feeling, thinking, decision and action” (2015, 3), notall cultures have a “strong sense of unique personality that modern individualismentails” in which the individual is “the sovereign arbiter of his or her destiny in themodern ‘I did it my way’ sense” (2015, 3). Writing on the relationship betweencommunity and individual in the Gospel of John, Bauckham argues:The life of the community, the disciples’ mutual love, stems from therelationship between each individual and Jesus. The latter entails theformer, but individual relationship to Jesus has priority. Thecommunity is constituted by individual relationship with Jesus andsubsists only through individual relationship with Jesus. (2015, 9)For these reasons, I think we ought to resist any social ontology of the Church whichthinks of the Church’s existence and relationship to God as more real or moreimportant than the individual’s relationship to God. Many of the animation theoriesof early 20th Century sociology do just this. Indeed, Bonhoeffer raises a very similarconcern with the application of animation theories to explain the collectivepersonhood of the Church. While Bonhoeffer thinks that animation theorists are rightto stress that human beings are structurally open (i.e. the self is defined in relation tothe other), we cannot make sense of this notion without also describing human beingsas structurally closed. Bonhoeffer argues that,
22 Another concern with animation accounts concerns the description of the Spirit only as a uniting
force. This downplays the significance of the Spirit as a person. If we are to take seriously an AthanasianTrinitarian theology in which the Spirit is a co-equal divine person, then we should think of the Spiritas having a will and an agency in His own right. But as an anonymous referee points out, this objectionis not decisive and many contemporary theologians writing on pneumatology describe the work of theSpirit as that of a mysterious force. Thus, while there may be Athanasian motivations for rejecting thisview of the Spirit, the modern theologian who endorses the animation view might just bite the bullethere.
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the “openness” of the person demands “closedness” as a correlative, orone could not speak of openness at all. In a certain sense, therefore, thequestion whether individual being exists, untouched by all socialbonds, must be answered in the affirmative, in order not to give up theidea of the I-You-relation. . . . The tragedy of all idealist philosophy wasthat it never ultimately broke through to personal spirit. (2009, 73-74)And thus, if we wish to take seriously Bauckham’s concern in claiming that the Churchis constituted by individual disciples of Christ (claim 1 of the initial constraints), thenwe should look to a social ontology which affirms the individual.Thirdly, let us consider the applicability of functionalist accounts of groupagency. In some respects, this model looks the least well suited for the context ofecclesiology. List and Pettit spend a considerable amount of time giving an account ofthe deliberative processes by which corporations and organisations can meet theconditions for agency. While some of this may be relevant to thinking about the workof gathered church communities, it looks like a poor fit for explaining the agency ofthe Church as a whole.23 For while committees and hierarchies undoubtedly play arole in the decision-making processes of individual churches and denominations, itwould be strange to suggest that such processes have much to do with the Church’sactions as a whole. If we are members of the Church as a functionalist group agent,then clearly none of us have a particularly active role to play in the Church’s agency.This is a point Underhill makes, albeit in very different terms. She writes,This total liturgical life of the Corpus Christi is not merely a collective ofservices, offices, and sacraments. Deeply considered, it is the sacrificiallife of Christ Himself; the Word indwelling in His Church, gathering inHis eternal priestly action the small Godward movements, sacrifices,and aspirations of ‘all the broken and the meek,’ and acting throughthose ordered signs and sacraments by means of these His members onearth. Whether this Church be given hard and fast juridical boundaries,as in Roman Catholicism, or is seen as a group of autonomous families,as by Anglicans and Orthodox, or felt to be independent of visibleexpression, as by Quakers and other Independents, the principle is thesame: the eternal self-offering of Christ to God in and through hismystical body. Hence the corporate worship of the Church is not simplythat of an assembly of individuals who believe the same things, andtherefore unite in doing the same things. It is real in its own right; anaction transcending and embracing all the separate souls taking part init. The individual as such dies to his separate selfhood—even hisspiritual selfhood—on entering the Divine Society: is ‘buried in
23 I think List and Pettit’s account actually is relatively well suited to thinking about agency in thegathered Church, see (Cockayne, 2018) where I discuss this in detail. Indeed, List and Pettit evensuggest that such an application may be appropriate in writing, “In a hierarchical organization, such asa commercial corporation or a church, there may be differences in the members’ roles, for examplethrough holding different offices or through belonging to subgroups with different tasks” (2011, 36).
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baptism’ and reborn as a living cell of the Mystical Body of Christ (1936,86).The worship of the Church is not some summation of all of the deliberating processesof the gathered churches and individuals which constitute it. While the authorizationmodel gives too little role for the actions of individuals in contributing to the agencyof the Church, the functionalist model gives too great a role. Thus, List and Pettit’smodel of functional group agency looks difficult to extend in thinking about theChurch.The picture looks bleak, then, for applying social ontology to help think aboutecclesiology. However, in the next section, I develop an alternative functionalistaccount of the Church’s ontology, by building on some brief remarks which List andPettit make at the beginning of their account. I suggest that some version of thefunctionalist account can meet the criteria laid out in the first part of this paper.
Honey Bees and Terrorist Cells: A better functionalist
ontology of the ChurchUnderhill’s claim that Christ acts “through those ordered signs and sacraments bymeans of these His members on earth” (1936, 86) can provide a helpful point forthinking about what participation in the Church consists in, in such a way that doesnot reduce to authorization, but which does not depend too heavily on human agencyeither. List and Pettit’s primary concern in Group Agency is to provide an account ofhow corporations and other groups could be considered agents, and thereforeresponsible agents, capable of being held to account for their actions. Yet, beforeoutlining this account, they offer some brief provocative remarks about how a groupcan be considered an agent, without any joint intentionality from its members. First,List and Pettit suggest that, by “a process of natural or cultural evolution” membersof a group might possess certain traits that “lead them to act as required for groupagency” (2011, 32). While they admit there are no obvious human examples of suchphenomena, they note that we can observe something like this in the natural world.For instance, consider the following description of the decision-making processes ofhoney-bee colonies:It is a long-standing empirical fact that, in late spring or early summer,a colony of honey bees that has reached a certain size tends to divideitself: the queen leaves with roughly two thirds of the worker bees, anda daughter queen stays behind in the parental nest with the rest of theworker bees. How does the swarm that has left the colony find a newhome? Empirical work . . . has revealed a mechanism involving a“search committee” of several hundred bees—the scouts—who fly outto inspect potential nest sites and then come back and perform waggledances to advertise any good sites they have discovered. Initially, the
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scouts visit and inspect sites randomly, but once the dancing activityhas built up, they are more likely to visit and inspect the sitesadvertised by others. Back at the swarm, each bee dances for the siteshe has inspected, with the duration of the dance depending on herperception of the site’s quality: the better the site, the longer the dance.Thus high-quality sites receive more advertisement and are visited bymore scout bees, which in turn generate even more dance activity forthese sites. The process eventually leads to a “consensus”: The dancingand visiting concentrates on one popular site, and the swarm movesthere. . . . The striking empirical fact is that, when different possiblenest sites vary in quality, the bees usually choose the best one (Seeleyand Buhrman, 2001).In this kind of case, List and Pettit suggest, “bees can combine, on the basis of simplesignals, so as to perform as a group agent” (2011, 33).24 While no single bee has thiscomplex level of decision making by itself, the swarm as a whole has “impressivepowers of decision making, especially with respect to simultaneous-option decisions”(2011, 249). Thus, even though no joint intentionality (at least not in the way that thisterm is often used) is taking place in the bee colony, because of their naturalinteractivity, the bees display evidence of agency at a group level. List and Pettit writethat, “It is harder to imagine, though not conceptually impossible, that nature orculture could work to a similar effect on human beings eliciting, coalescent agents”(2011, 33). Could such a possibility help to explain the agency of the Church? Perhapsso. I will return to this analogy shortly.Before doing so, let us consider a second brief example of agency without jointintentionality. List and Pettit write,A second way in which a group agent may form without joint intentionis perhaps more plausible. This would involve one or severalorganizational designers co-opting others into a structureunderpinning group agency, without making them aware of theiragency at the group level and without seeking their intentionalacquiescence in the arrangement. Think of the cellular organization bywhich, so we are told, many terrorist organizations have operated. Wecan imagine that a cellular network may be established for thepromotion of some goals, without those recruited to the differentcellular tasks being aware of the overall purpose; they may be kept inthe dark or even deceived about it. The organization would becomposed of a group of people, in perhaps a thin sense of group, andwould function as an agent. But it would do so without joint intentionamong its members, with the possible exception of a few coordinators.(2011, 33)
24 To consider this example in more detail, see Seeley, 2001 and List, Elsholtz, and Seeley, 2009.
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Note that unlike the case of the honey-bee colony, in the case of the terrorist cell, theremay be some basic level of joint intentionality between agents at a group level. Yet, itis the decision-making processes of those in positions of power that allows the groupas a whole to function as an agent. The coordinators of the group’s action wouldprovide instructions, and guidance to those on the ground level, but those whoparticipate at the ground level would act with no awareness of just how their actionscontributed to the actions of the group as a whole. It is only through the contributionof all of the members that the necessary intentional states arise—both thecoordinators and the enactors are necessary for allowing the group as a whole to actwith the relevant motivational and representational states.The above models have great potential to explain the agency of the Church asa whole, I think. While comparing the ontology of the Church to a terroristorganization might feel unsavoury to some, it provides some helpful insight in anumber of areas. In what follows, I will describe my preferred model for the ontologyof the Church—the modified functionalist model (MFM). On the MFM, the Church is aunified group which functions as an agent with representational and motivationalstates and is capable of acting on these states. It is constituted by individual Christiandisciples and is united by the internal promptings of the Holy Spirit (akin to theindividual bee’s biological responses to one another) and the external commands ofthe Holy Spirit (akin to a terrorist overlord’s commands to the cell). In filling thisaccount out I will show where MFM fits alongside the other three models outlined inthe previous section.First, in contrast to the authorization model, MFM explains how human beingscan contribute to, and participate in, the worship of the Church, while still allowingthe primary agents to be Christ and the Holy Spirit. Like ground level terrorist cellsand cell members, individual Christians act in submission to the group coordinators,namely, the Holy Spirit and Christ. Thus, in participating in the actions of the Church,members do not always act in full awareness of how their actions contribute to theactions of the Church as a whole. Thus, like Underhill stresses, Christ acts by means ofthe actions of the Church’s members. In participating in the Church’s worship, we arelike obedient members of ground-level terrorist cells, who respond to the call of thegroup coordinators. It is the job of the coordinators to unite the actions of themembers into a coherent group action, and to shape and instruct those on the groundlevel. On MFM, it is the role of the Holy Spirit to provide such unity. The Spirit takesour actions, performed in participation of some gathered church, or in privateworship, and unites them in line with the will of Christ, the head of the Church. Thus,we can affirm that Christ is the primary agent in the Church’s worship, while stillaffirming that our contribution in participating in this worship requires more thanauthorizing Christ to act on our behalf.How does the Spirit communicate the will of Christ to the Church? By meansof the revelation of truth in Scripture and by guiding individuals supernaturally in thepractices of the Church. Underhill emphasises the importance of the Spirit’s leadingthe outward forms of the Church’s actions in worship, in writing,We do not get a real view of the situation, unless we add to them (theEucharist and Daily Office) another and very different form of
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expression; the free, enthusiastic, unstylized group worship, thespontaneous response to the stirrings of the Spirit, which began in thechildhood of the Church and—now for the most part separated fromher liturgical action—has continued in various expressions ever since,sometimes going underground for long periods but sooner or laterbreaking out with disconcerting vigour and freedom (1936, 87).Here the analogy with honey bees becomes helpful. In faithfully responding to the willof the Spirit in worship, it might be possible for us to move from merely following theinstructions of the Spirit, to instinctively coordinate with other Spirit-filled Christians.Unlike the terrorist cell, however, this may not require any immediate awareness ofthe work of the Spirit, but, rather, in responding obediently to God, we might, likehoney bees, unite in ways more profoundly than we are capable of reflecting upon.Thus, the work of the Spirit is twofold: (i) the Spirit takes a guiding role byrevealing the will of Christ through prayer, Scripture, and by relating to the othermembers of the Church (i.e. in a similar way to the communication of terroristcoordinators), and, (ii) the Spirit takes a shaping role, by means of the Spirit’sindwelling the individual believer, the Spirit shapes the actions of individuals in waysthey may be unaware of, to conform to the will of Christ (i.e. in a similar way to thebiological impulses of honey bees).Secondly, also in contrast to the authorization model, this model allows us todescribe the Church as sinful and can explain how human individuals, and not thepersons of the Trinity, are the agents of sin. Here, the importance of the Holy Spirit incommunicating the will of Christ becomes important. For just as members of terroristcells can respond faithfully or unfaithfully to the instructions of their coordinators,we can respond faithfully or unfaithfully to the instructions of the Holy Spirit. Thepresence of rogue agents attests to this possibility within terrorist organizations.While rogue agents might occasionally act accidentally in line with the will of theircoordinators in acting in defiance of their immediate instructions, often they do not.Rogue agents act from a sense of feeling more important than they actually are, andas considering themselves more informed about the will of the organization than theyactually are. What could be a better picture of the defiance of individuals within theChurch? Instead of submitting to the will of the Spirit, who unites our actions in waysunfathomable to us, all too often we assume that we have grasped the will of Christsufficiently to act in our own strength. While these rogue actions might still beregarded as broadly under the umbrella of the Church as a group agent, they arecontrary to the will of Christ, manifested by the instruction of the Spirit. And thus,since it is plainly the case that the Church often diverges from the will of the Christ,despite his desire for unity, we can regard the Church as sinful, as well as united.Next, unlike the animation model, the MFM is individualistic about the humanperson. That is, we need not appeal to any mysterious force to explain the unity of thewhole. Indeed, unlike the animation model, this unity is provided by means of the willof a person, or of a group of persons; the Holy Spirit manifests the will of Christ to theChurch to bring about unity in action. While this model emphasises the importance ofmystery in what Christ’s specific will for the Church is, it does not appeal to somemetaphysically strange force which emerges each time groups are formed. If the
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persons of the Trinity are to be considered persons, then I think we have no need toappeal to anti-individualism to explain the unity of the Church, we need only appealto the coordinating will of the Trinity as the driving force of the Church’s unity.Finally, contrary to List and Pettit’s functionalist model, MFM does notoverstate the importance of the actions of individual participants. Individualparticipants contribute to the actions of the Church only insofar as Christ wills it tobe the case, and only insofar as the gathered churches and individuals submit to thewill of the Spirit in their participation in the Church. Thus, the MFM allows us to havea stronger notion of participation than the authorization model, but a weaker notionof participation than the functionalist model.
ConclusionMFM meets all of the criteria laid out in 1-6. According to MFM, the Church isconstituted by individual Christian disciples, who in turn, coalesce into gatheredcollectives (conditions 1, 2). The unity of the Church is brought about by the work ofthe Spirit, who through instruction and guidance made possible by the liturgies of theChurch, and his indwelling the mind of each individual believer, shapes the actions ofthe individual constituent parts to form motivational and representational states,which meet the necessary conditions for agency (condition 5). The Spirit enacts thiswork in line with the will of Christ, the head of the Church (condition 6). Finally, sinceeach constituent member of the Church can reject or act in defiance of the will ofChrist made manifest by the Holy Spirit, the actions of gathered collectives andindividual disciples can diverge from the purposes of God, thereby bringing aboutapparent disunity within a united whole (conditions 3, 4).It is important to note that my claim in this paper is not that a modifiedfunctionalist social ontology can exhaustively explain the nature of the Church. Yet, inreflecting on the ways in which social ontology explains the nature of social wholesmore generally, we have seen that there is much that can help explain the nature andontology of the Church. In exploring these ideas, I hope that more philosophers andtheologians in the analytic tradition will take seriously the need for thinkinganalytically about the Church. In particular, one of the topics which my proposedmodel depends heavily on, is the role of the Holy Spirit in uniting the actions of thosewho participate in the Church. Yet, just as the topic of ecclesiology has been largelyignored by analytic thinkers, the topic of pneumatology has received equally, if notlesser, attention. Perhaps, this article will provide the beginning of a conversation andthat those working in analytic theology can see the importance and value of analyticecclesiology.25
25 This article would not have been possible without the invaluable feedback and advice of KoertVerhagen, over a number of conversations. I would also like to thank Jonathan Rutledge, David Efird,and an anonymous referee for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Finally, manythanks to the Templeton Religion Trust for their generous funding during the writing of this paper.
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